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INTRODUCTION
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 was enacted at least in
part because of a twenty-five per cent rise in the overall manufacturing in-
jury rate between 1964 and 1969.1 The congressional response was a man-
datory standards approach to occupational injuries and disease. The Act also
created a new agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), with the power to promulgate and enforce a variety of workplace
standards. Failure by a firm to comply with OSHA's standards, as detected
by unannounced inspections, was made punishable by fines up to $1,000
for each violation.
2
This standards approach is subject to several objections widely accepted
among economists. First, standards may bear no relationship to hazards in a
particular operation, yet compliance (at whatever cost) is mandatory.3
Second, by requiring a certain set of safety inputs rather than by penalizing
an unwanted outcome, such as injuries, the standards approach does not en-
courage firms to seek other, perhaps cheaper, ways of reducing injuries.
Third, the promulgated standards are so numerous (approximately 1,700)4
and workplaces so diverse, that one must question how comprehensive or
knowledgeable inspections can be.5 In short, the standards approach is not
generally compatible with the goal of achieving a given reduction in injuries
in the least-cost manner.6
An "injury tax" approach to occupational safety and health, under which
the government would levy a monetary penalty on firms for each work in-
*Assistant Professor, New York State School of Labor and Industrial Relations, Cornell Uni-
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Gordon, and George Johnson on earlier drafts of this paper. David Smith provided valuable
research assistance in the estimation of compensating wage differentials.
1 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, INJURY RATES BY INDUSTRY, 1969 (B.L.S. Rep. No. 389, 1971); U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, INJURY RATES BY INDUSTRY, 1964 AND 1965 (B.L.S. Rep. No. 342, 1968).
2 Occ. Safety & Health Act § 17(b), 29 U.S.C. § 666(b) (1970).
3 The courts have ruled that the absence of previous injuries is not a defense against the re-
quirement to comply with safety standards. OSHA, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Violation Without Injury,
2 JoB SAFETY & HEALTH, Feb. 1974, at 30.
4 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.1-.309 (1973).
5 One indication that inspectors may find violations only of the limited set of standards with
which they are familiar is that one per cent of the standards account for thirty-eight per cent of
all citations. OSHA, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Standards by Frequency of Violation, Sept. 11, 1973
(OSHA internal printout).
6 This paper ignores the more basic question of the optimality of any government safety program.
Rather, it is assumed that society has decided to reduce work injuries and therefore is seeking the
least-cost method of achieving this reduction. While it is recognized that there are market incentives
for safety independent of government programs, the assumption here is that a social decision
has been made to reduce injuries below the level induced by private costs alone.
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jury or case of disease, would not be susceptible to these objections, pro-
viding it could be demonstrated that employers would respond to market
incentives in the safety and health area. The injury tax would penalize injuries
directly, leaving the employer free to seek the minimum-cost method of
achieving reduction. While he might decide his injury rate could be reduced
most efficiently by adhering to the presently required standards, he would not
be required to do so nor would his government-induced safety incentives be
limited to such a response.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the feasibility-politics aside-
of the tax approach to occupational safety (occupational diseases are
ignored). Specifically, two questions are posed: (1) is there evidence that firms
would respond to an injury tax by taking the steps necessary to reduce
injuries and, if so, (2) roughly how large would the average tax have to be to
achieve given reductions in the injury rate? The answer to the second ques-
tion, which involves the cost of reducing injuries, is also relevant in evaluating
the current level of OSHA inspections and fines. Last year OSHA inspected
one per cent of covered firms (with ten per cent of all employees) and
assessed fines averaging $169 per noncomplying firm or $26 per violation,
7
suggesting that OSHA implicitly believes injury reduction can be accom-
plished very cheaply."
Answers to the two questions posed by this paper are developed by for-
mulating a theory of work injuries (Part I), specifying an empirically
testable version of that theory (Part II), and then reporting the results and
policy implications of such a test (Part III). Finally, the major conclusions
are summarized nonmathematically.
I
A THEORY OF WORK INJURIES
To test the hypothesis that the level of work injuries is responsive to market
(or price) incentives, we will begin with a standard, profit-maximizing model
of a firm whose workers are exposed to risk of injury. Under such a model
the firm can accept higher injury rates and pay their associated costs (wage
premiums to workers, damage to equipment, and extra costs of training
workers) or it can purchase safety inputs (such as machine guards, training
sessions, and protective clothing) in order to reduce injuries. The firm will
choose a level of safety inputs-and, consequently, an injury rate-at which
the marginal cost of reducing the injury rate equals the marginal savings from
7 OSHA, U.S. Dep't of Labor, News Briefs, JOB SAFETY & HEALTH. News Briefs is a regular feature
of this OSHA trade periodical; the issues utilized for the purposes of this analysis were August
through December in volume 1 (1973), and January through April in volume 2 (1974).
8 A profit-maximizing firm will only comply with OSHA standards if the costs of compliance
are less than the expected costs of noncompliance. A National Association of Manufacturers
survey found that firms with 100 to 500 employees (the size OSHA typically inspects) estimate it
would cost $104,000 to comply with OSHA standards. Although these figures must be discounted
to some extent because of the political warfare between government and business over safety
legislation, the magnitude of the discrepancy between the cost of compliance and the expected
penalties for noncompliance is remarkable. See What Does It Cost to Comply With OSHA?, Occu-
PATIONAL HAZARDS, Oct. 1973, at 114.
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the reduction. The injury rate consistent with profit-maximization will be
shown to vary across firms (or industries) with the costs of reducing injuries,
the savings from such reduction, and the degree of danger inherent in the
technologies involved. 9
More formally, consider the firm attempting to maximize its profits, V,
which can be represented by the following equation:
(1) V = PQQ(L,K) - W(a)L - caL - PSL - rK
where PQ = price of output, Q;
L = man-hours of labor hired;
K = capital (except safety inputs);
W = wage rate;
r = rental price of capital;
a = injury rate = I/L, where
I = number of injuries;
S = safety inputs per man-hours hired,10 and Ps = unit price
of such inputs;
c = cost per injury (except conpensating wage differential).
Note that aL = I, the number of injuries, and that W is a function of a.
Specifically, we assume that dW/da > 0; that is, we assume workers must be
paid a compensating wage differential in order to induce them to accept
dangerous jobs. The costs of injuries represented by c (assumed to be a
constant for the firm) include lost production time of the victim and other
workers, damage to equipment, training costs of replacement workers, and
administrative costs. The following relationship is also assumed:
(2) a = a(S), da/dS < 0, d2a/dS2 > 0.
The total cost, M, of injuries to the firm can be expressed as
(3) M = a(dW/da)L + caL.
Because a = I/L, equation (3) can be rewritten in terms of I:
(4) M = (dW/da)I + cI.
Although L*, K*, and S*-the profit maximizing levels of inputs-are
simultaneously derived from all three first-order conditions for profit-max-
imization, it is especially informative to assume L and K are fixed and look
at the first-order condition with respect to S:
(5) dV/dS = -L (dW/da) (da/dS) - cL (da/dS) - .PL = 0.
With elementary manipulation the above can be rewritten as
(6) dW/da + c = -P, (dS/da),
where the left-hand side equals dM/dI (see equation 4).
9 Chelius, An Empirical Analysis of Safety Regulation, in 3 SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 53 (1973), and Russell, Pricing
Industrial Accidents, in id. at 27, attempt to relate the injury rate to workmen's compensation costs.
Russell's study could not establish a strong linkage primarily because workmen's compensation
premiums are relatively inelastic with respect to injuries. Chelius related injury rates to workmen's
compensation benefit levels across states and obtained perverse results, perhaps because higher
benefits reduce the cost of injury to the employee, thereby reducing incentives for caution. See
also Chelius, The Control of Industrial Accidents: Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence, 38 LAw
& CoNTEMP. PROB. 700 (1974).
10 To avoid unnecessary complications, the model does not assume hours per worker to be sub-
ject to the firm's control in maximizing profits.
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Equation (6) specifies the determinants of S*, the optimal level of safety
inputs, as illustrated in panel A of Figure 1. To determine the injury rate, a*,
consistent with profit-maximization requires the specification of the relation-
ship between a and S, as illustrated in panel B of Figure 1. The profit-max-
imizing injury rate in firm x, a*,, is less than that of firm y, because for
equal levels of S, a, > a,. To express this notion in more formal terms,
we may say that the risk, R, inherent in the technology employed by firm y
exceeds that in the techniques employed by firm x. Thus, the influence of
inherent risk on a* must explicitly be taken into account along with the
"market" influences on S*.
In sum, then, theory leads us to expect a* to vary across firms (or
industries) negatively with dMdI and positively with P, and R:"1
(7) a* = a* [(dM~dI), P,, R].
Assuming that a, the observed injury rate, equals a* + e (stochastic error
term) and that equation (7) can be approximated by a linear form, we can
obtain the following generalized estimating equation:
(8) a = a (dM/dl) + 3P + yR + e.
FIGURE 1
-P,(dS/da)
/• (dW/da) + c
DETERMINATION OF "OPTIMAL" INJURY RATE
t R affects a* directly, as shown in panel B of Figure 1. However, in general, R will indirectly
influence a*-not necessarily in the same direction-through dS/da, an element of the marginal
cost on injury reduction (along with P,). If a(S) = RSX, a functional form possessing the char-
acteristics assumed in equation (2) if X > 0, it can readily be shown that
(i) a*'Ia,* = (RJR,) 1/1 +X.
In short, with the above functional form, the profit-maximizing injury rate rises with increases in R.
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II
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
Empirical estimation of a is of particular interest for our purposes, be-
cause a indicates the response of the injury rate to an increase in the mar-
ginal cost of injuries. The sign and significance of & will indicate whether
market. incentives influence the injury rate. The size of & can be used to
roughly assess the levels of injury taxes required to reduce injury rates by
given amounts.
We turn now to the task of empirically identifying R, P8 , and dM/dI.
In specifying an estimable version of equation (8), it is necessary to use data
at the industry level of aggregation, because a sufficiently rich microfile
simply does not exist. Therefore, the data used relate to thirty manufacturing
industries selected solely on the basis of data availability.
A. Empirical Specification of R
The two major groups of influences on R are the personal characteristics
of workers employed and the physical characteristics of their jobs and plant.
Studies have consistently shown that younger workers are more likely to be
injured than older ones, with the rate peaking in the 18-25 age group. Some
studies attribute the age-injury profile to job experience, some to the risk-
taking associated with youth, and some to both.12 Prudence suggests, there-
fore, that proxies for both age and experience be included among the measur-
able determinants of R. Our measure of age (A) corresponds to the percentage
of workers in the industry under 26 years of age. The rate of new hires (NH)
for the industry is our proxy for the proportion of inexperienced employees.
An analysis of work injuries in 1971 found that 22.6 per cent were the
result of handling objects, 20.4 per cent were due to falls, and 13.6 per cent
involved being struck by falling objects.' 3 All three kinds of injuries are more
likely to occur when materials are being moved, especially when being moved
by hand. Further, extremes in such environmental conditions as lighting,
noise, temperature, and humidity are also believed to increase the risk of
injury.' 4 A study of occupational characteristics 5 by Lucas 6 found that
within each race/sex group lower-paying occupations were more apt to re-
quire the climbing, stooping, and heavy lifting associated with moving ob-
jects by hand; the lower-paying occupations were also more likely to expose
workers to extremes of heat, light, noise, and other hazards. Finally, Lucas
found that females and whites were exposed to the above hazards less than
12 A. R. HALE & M. HALE, A REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT RESEARCH LITERATURE 35
(1972); J. SuRRy, AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT RESEARCH AND RE-
LATED FIELDS 14 (1969); Oi, On the Economics oflndustrial Safety, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 669 (1974).
13 NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 31 (1972).
14J. SuRRY, supra note 12, at 86-98.
15 2 MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL
TITLES (3d ed. 1965), was used to obtain a variety of characteristics associated with 295 occupations.
10 R.E.B. Lucas, Working Conditions, Wage-Rates and Human Capital: A Hedonic Study,
1972 (unpublished doctoral dissertation in M.I.T. Library).
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males and blacks.' 7 These findings suggest that the wage rate (W) and the
percentages of the work force which are female (F) and nonwhite (B) can
be used to proxy exposure to hazardous working requirements and con-
ditions.18
In addition to the nearly 57 per cent of work injuries associated with
handling objects, falls, and being struck by falling objects, another 17 per
cent involved machinery or vehicles. Exposure to machines and vehicles may
be measured by horsepower per production worker (HP), which rises as
both the number and power of machinery and vehicles per worker increases.
We shall also control for the percentage of production workers (PW) among
the total.19
B. Empirical Specification of P,
Gordon 20 hypothesizes that there are economies of scale in the provision
of such inputs as safety committees, first-aid stations, safety directors, and
safety training programs. While the proportion of total safety costs that is at-
tributable to these inputs is unknown, it seems reasonable to suppose that
the per-worker price of safety inputs (P,) falls to some degree as firm size
increases. Thus, average firm size (FS) is included as a crude proxy for p,.21
71d. at 138, 403-11.
1I Employing the wage rate as a proxy for exposure to environmental or job hazards raises
questions of how much of this exposure is inherent in the technology (the choice of which is assumed
to be independent of the cost of injuries), how much is due to the greater incentives employers
have to safeguard skilled workers, and whether the two factors can be separated at all. In the con-
text of this paper, these questions are moot, because, as will be shown, the wage variable will pick
up the effects of both factors. In the case of noise, heat, and so forth, the two factors of "inherent"
and "induced" risk may well be hopelessly intertwined. The requirements of climbing, stooping,
and strength may well be inherent in low-skilled occupations, because skilled workers undoubtedly
have a comparative- advantage in precision processing of materials as opposed to simply moving
them; a similar argumeilt can be made.with respect to females.
The greater exposure of nonwhites to risk may reflect discrimination. Indeed, it will be inter-
esting to see if, controlling for wages, nonwhites have higher injury rates. Becker's theory of dis-
crimination predicts that nonwhites will receive lower wages for the same work where segregation
is impossible if employers or fellow employees are prejudiced. G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF
DISCIMINATION (2d ed. 1971). A simple corollary to this hypothesis is that, with wages held constant,
nonwhites will be found in the more disagreeable and risky jobs.
" Little is known about the relationship between injuries and fatigue. M. SCHULZINGER, THE
ACCIDENT SYNDROME 29-33 (1956), notes the diurnal cycle of work injuries (10 a.m. and 3 p.m.
peaks), butJ. SuRRY, supra note 12, at 114-15, and A.R. HALE & M. HALE, supra note 12, at 45-48,
emphasize work rates rather than fatigue in explaining this cycle. In addition, data from Pennsyl-
vania indicate that the injury rate does not rise during overtime hours, when workers are pre-
sumably most fatigued. See Oi, supra note 12. However, Smith, Intertemporal Changes in Work Injury
Rate, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH
ANNIVERSARY (ANNUAL WINTER) MEETING 167 (1973), found a positive intertemporal relationship
between injury rates and overtime. Initial experimenting with the use of overtime hours per week
in the current study could not demonstrate a positive relationship between injuries and overtime;
therefore, overtime hours worked was not among our proxies for R.20 J.B. GORDON, A. AKMAN & M. BROOKS, INDUSTRIAL SAFETY STATISTICS: A RE-EXAMINATION
149 (1971).
21 Firm size also is a good proxy for the degree to which workmen's compensation premiums
reflect actual injury experience. However, as indicated in note 9 supra, the elasticity of the premium
with respect to experience is very low for all but the largest firms. Hence, the strength of the
experience-rating factor may not be measurable.
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Unions, too, may reduce P8 by providing information to firms on hazards
or by increasing the safety-consciousness of their members. We include the
percentage of workers who are unionized (U) to reflect this effect. Other
than as modified by FS and U, we assume P, to be constant across
industries.
C. Empirical Specification of dM/dI
Referring back to equation (4) we can see that dM/dI is hypothesized to
equal dW/da (the marginal compensating wage differential) plus c (a con-
stant cost per injury due to machine damage, lost time, administrative costs,
and the costs of training replacements). Estimation of dW/da is discussed
first-and in some detail-because it involves estimating a wage equation
with risk of injury included as an independent variable. 22
In the absence of full ex post compensation for injuries, one would
expect workers to obtain ex ante compensation in the form of wage
premiums sufficient to cover the losses imposed on them by injuries. If
the wage premiums were not sufficient to.cover these losses, workers would
not be attracted to the industry or firm because their net wage would be
higher elsewhere. More formally, the equilibrium condition which must hold
across industries, assuming risk neutrality and homogeneous preferences
among workers, is
(9) Wo - E(Lu) = Wn(H, Z,),
where Wi1 is the gross (observed) wage of the ith worker in the jth class of
workers, W n his net wage stated as a function of human capital (H) and
other variables (Z), and E(L) is his expected uncompensated losses from
injury.
E(L) is assumed to be the sum of the expected losses of three levels of
injuries: death, permanent impairment and temporary disability (levels A,
B and C, respectively). The probability of being killed during any hour of
work is PAa, where a is the hourly injury rate and PA is the fraction of in-
juries resulting in death; the probabilities of incurring nonfatal injuries are
similarly calculated. We assume the losses associated with each level of injury
are proportional to the wage rate; for example, the losses associated with
death are rAW. Substituting these definitions into equation (9) we obtain
(10) Wu [1-au (rAPAu + rBPBu + rCPC%)] = W n (Hj, Zj).
Assuming the reduction in gross wages due to expected injury-related losses
is less than 50 per cent, we can use the approximation In (1 + x) = x in
rewriting (10) as
(11) /nWtu = rAPAuau + rPBjao + rCPCfau + /nWn(Hj, Zj).
Equation (11) suggests an estimating equation where an individual's wage
(in logarithms) is regressed against the probability of his sustaining an injury
resulting in death, permanent impairment, and temporary disability, plus the
" A more detailed development of the compensating differential estimates is contained in
R. SMITH, COMPENSATING WAGE DIFFERENTIALS AND HAZARDOUS WoRK (Dep't of Labor, Office
of the Ass't Secretary for Policy, Evaluation, and Research, Office of Evaluation Technical Anal-
ysis Series Paper No. 5, 1973).
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determinants of his net wage (in logarithms). Data on Wi, and the deter-
minants of Wn were obtained for 3,183 white males from the May 1967
Current Population Survey, 23 which contained supplemental data on wage
rates and union membership collected as part of the Survey of Economic
Opportunity. The independent variables included as determinants of Wn were
virtually the same as those used by Oaxaca 24 in an earlier study using the
same data: education, experience, union membership, class of worker, occu-
pation, demographic characteristics, geographical dummies, migration vari-
ables, and in one specification, industry dummies. Table A of the Appendix
lists these variables and their estimated coefficients.
The probability of injury assigned to each individual was the average for
the industry in which he works. 25 The industry rate, a, is the frequency rate
(disabling injuries per million man-hours) corrected to an hourly basis,
that is, the published frequency rate divided by 1,000,000 so that hourly
wages could be stated as a function of hourly risks. pA, PB, and pC were also
obtained from published sources. 26 The estimated coefficient of each injury
variable corresponds to rA, r B, and rC; the estimates are summarized in Table I.
Specifications I and II are similar, except that the latter includes industry
group dummies and the former does not.27 The results suggest the presence
of a compensating differential related to the probability of death, where ex
post compensation to the employee is impossible, but cast doubt on the ex-
istence of such differentials for the more easily-compensable lesser injuries.
The differential related to death is plausibly large, lending credibility to the
estimates.28
To construct industry estimates of dW/da, we note, from equation (11),
that for industry k
(12) (dW/da)k = Wk (dlnW/da)k = Wk (rAPAk + rBPBk + rCPCI).
The results in Table I, plus equation (12) suggest two alternative methods of
estimating (dW/da)k:
(13) (dW/da)kl = Wk (1.238P.4 + .075p B + -. 006Pkc) X 101, or
(14) (dW/da),2 = Wk (.636P&A) x 106.
23 Unpublished files, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Dep't of Commerce.
24 Oaxaca, Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets, 14 INT'L ECON. REv. 693 (1973).
2' Using industry averages to represent risks facing individuals poses an errors-in-variables
problem, potentially biasing the coefficients toward zero. Given the lack of firm-specific injury
data cross-tabulated by occupation, however, the problem is unavoidable. R. Thaler & S. Rosen,
The Value of Saving a Life: Evidence From the Labor Market (paper presented at the National
Bureau of Economic Research Conference, Washington, D.C., Nov. 30, 1973), estimate com-
pensating differentials using actuarial data on a few occupations, but using such data here would
make it impossible to translate the results into estimates of dW/da across industries. Their measure
of risk is, of course, also subject to measurement error.
26 Data on a, pA, 1P, and Pc were obtained by SIC code from U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, INJURY RATES
BY INDUSTRY, 1966 AND 1967 (B.L.S. Rep. No. 360, 1969). The data were then converted to
Census codes for purposes of analysis.27 The test including industry group dummies is the more stringent for compensating wage
differentials because the differentials must, in effect, be estimated solely from intra-group varia-
tions in injury rates.
28 Although an extrapolation so far outside the observed range of the "death risk" variable is
speculative in the extreme, it is instructive to note that ajob involving certain death would command
a wage rate of between $1.8 and $3.3 million-dose enough to infinity to be credible.
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TABLE I
ESTIMATES OF PROPORTIONATE COMPENSATING
WAGE DIFFERENTIALS
Estimates (t values) of
rA r* rC
Specification I 1.238 x 106 .075 x 106 -. 006 X 106
(6.97) (2.57) (-3.79)
Specification II .636 x 106 -. 033 x 106 -. 002 x 100
(2.40) (-.85) (-1.31)
Both methods yield the same average compensating differential, and it
was decided to employ both methods to determine the sensitivity of our es-
timates to changes in the construction of dW/da. The method represented by
equation (13) resulted in negative values of dW/da for some industries-
values which are inadmissable a priori. Negative values were therefore con-
strained in some formulations to equal zero in order to ensure that only cal-
culations which made economic sense were employed. 29
No new variables are defined to capture the effects of c, the other com-
ponent of the marginal cost of injuries. The potential costs of damage to
equipment across industries is adequately proxied by the horsepower
variable (HP). Replacement costs and the costs of lost production time due
to injuries are proportional to the wage rate,30 giving still further reason
to believe that injury rates would be lower in high wage industries. We as-
sume administrative costs associated with injuries are constant across
industries. Thus, a(dM/dI) in equation (8) is expressed as
(15) a(dMdI) = a(dW/da) + a0 1HP + a02W + ao,
where 0, 01, and 02 are unobservable constants imbedded in c.
D. Estimating Equation
The discussion above suggests the following version of equation (8):
(16) ak = t0o + a(dW/da)k + 8lW + 02HPk + /93NHk + /34Ak + i6sFk
+ PGPWk +/ 3 rBk + -ylFSk + 72Uk + ek.
As noted earlier, d is the parameter of primary interest because it is an
estimate of how responsive the injury rate is to a change in the cost of an
injury. (I3of31, and 132 include a-see equation (15)-but a cannot be
29 A third method of constructing estimates of dW/da-involving the use of the insignificant
coefficients in Specification II (Table I)-was rejected because it yielded negative values for dW/da
in twenty-seven of thirty industries. However, even this method results in essentially the same
ordering of industries by dW/da, and estimates using this method resulted in coefficients of the
same size and sign, but not significance, as those using the other methods.
30 See Oi, Labor as a Quasi-Fixed Factor of Production, 70 J. POL. ECON. 538 (Supp. 1962), for
evidence that hiring and training costs rise with wages.
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identified separately in them.) Our development of equation (16) suggests the
following sign expectations:
,< 0
1,13 ,137> 0.
Data on injuries, wages, horsepower, production workers, new hires, and
firm size were obtained for 1963 from the Census of Manufactures31 and
Employment and Earnings;3 2 data on females, nonwhites, age, and unioni-
zation relate to 1960 and were obtained from Pencavel3 3 and the 1960 Cen-
sus of Population.34
III
RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS
Equation (15) was estimated using the two-stage least squares (TSLS)
estimator because of the simultaneity between W and a. 5 The results are
presented in Table II, with ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates displayed
for comparative purposes. Rows A through F of Table II present the results
from estimating the model as originally specified. The estimates of a (the
coefficient of dW/da) all have the expected sign, are significant, and are
generally of the same magnitude. The coefficients of the wage rate (W),
insignificantly negative in the OLS estimates, become larger (absolutely) and
significant at least at the .10 level in the TSLS estimates. The estimated co-
efficient of the horsepower, new hires, percentage female, percentage non-
white, percentage production worker, and firm size variables all consistently
display their expected signs; all but the last two are usually significant at
the .05 level. Only the age and unionization variables have unexpected signs;
however, the standard errors almost always equal or exceed the estimated
coefficients on these variables.3 6
Because the risk and safety input price variables were necessarily spec-
ified in a rather ad hoc fashion it was thought prudent to exclude those which
apparently did not serve as adequate proxies and re-estimate the equations
to determine the effects on dQ, if any, of initial misspecification. Lines G
31 1, 3 U.S. BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS OF MANUFACTURES, 1963 (1966).
32 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1312-9, EMPLOYMENT AND
EARNINGS: UNITED STATES, 1909-72 (1973).
33J. PENCAVEL, AN ANALYSIS OF THE QUIT RATE IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY (1970).
34 2 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1960.
SUBJECT REPORTS. INDUSTRIAL CHA ACTEISTICS (Final Rep. No. PC(2) -7F, 1967).
35 In addition to the exogenous variables in equation (16), the following were employed in
creating an instrument for W: percentage of workers in the operative and laborer category, whether
the industry manufactured durables or non-durables, and the estimated value of dlnW/da.
20 The negative findings with respect to firm size and age are of particular interest because of
the zero-order inverse correlation between these variables and injury rates. Firm size, measured
across industries may capture very little of the scale economies or workmen's compensation in-
centives that exist in larger firms within industries. Our results do suggest, however, the tentative
hypothesis that the zero-order inverse correlation of age and injuries reflects the combined ef-
fects of low wages and the lack of experience associated with being newly hired.
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through I of Table II display the re-estimation results. The estimates of a
maintain their size and significance, as do the remaining variables. Overall,
the estimates of a are encouragingly robust with respect to size and sig-
nificance under varying estimating techniques, methods of calculating
dW/da, and specifications of the estimating equation.
Both the sign and the significance of c2 are consistent with the hy-
pothesis that, across industries, work injury rates are inversely correlated
with the cost to employers of injuries. In other words, employers do seem to
be responsive in their safety efforts to the cost of injuries. It would therefore
appear that, other things being equal, an injury tax would result in a re-
duction of the injury rate.
By how much a specified injury tax would reduce the average injury
rate can be deduced, at least roughly, from the point estimates of a. Table
III presents estimates of injury rate reductions for a variety of fines; alter-
native estimates of &--corresponding to the lowest, highest, and average
(absolute) values estimated-are used in an attempt to define the likely
range of response.
TABLE III
ESTIMATED REDUCTION IN THE MANUFACTURING
INJURY RATE BY SELECTED INJURY FINES
(1970 Average Injury Rate = 15.2)
Estimated Reduction (% Reduction) in Injury Rate
Fine Per Minimum Maximum Average
Injury = .49 x 10- 3 = .95x 10-3  .62 x 10-3
$ 500 .24 (1.6%) .48 (3.2%) .31 (2.0%)
1,000 .49 (3.2%) .95 (6.4%) .62 (4.1%)
2,000 .98 (6.4%) 1.90(12.5%) 1.24 (8.2%)
4,000 1.96(12.9%) 3.80(25%) 2.48(16.3%)
Table III suggests that substantial fines are required to reduce the injury
rate by even moderate amounts. A per injury fine of $2,000, for example,
would have been required to reduce the 1970 average manufacturing injury
rate to its 1968 level of 14.0 (using the average de). To achieve a reduction
in the injury rate of 10 per cent would appear to require a fine somewhere
between $1,600 and $3,100 per injury. Thus, our findings, as summarized
in Table I11, suggest that reductions in the injury rate below present levels
would be very costly to employers.
Are the above implications, derived from our estimates of a, credible?
Interestingly enough, our estimated fine of $1,600 to $3,100 per injury for
a one-time, 10 per cent reduction in the injury rate brackets the typical
estimated per injury cost of complying with OSHA standards-standards
which the agency hopes will yield at least initially a 10 per cent reduction in
injury rates.3 7 The National Association of Manufacturers survey found that
37 U.S. Dep't of Labor, Program Memorandum: Occupational Safety and Health 4 (mimeo,
1972).
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firms with fifty employees--the average number of employees for manu-
facturing firms is sixty-estimated the cost of complying with the Act to be
$33,000.38 Given that such firms have around 1.5 injuries per year (assuming
a frequency rate of 15 per million man-hours), and positing an 8 per cent in-
terest rate, we estimate that OSHA compliance costs per injury in a typical
manufacturing firm are about $1,800. While this correspondence of figures
should not be given too much weight because no one knows what compliance
with OSHA standards would do to injuries39 or whether the compliance
cost figures are biased, it is nevertheless encouraging that our estimates are
so close to those of a program of similar intent.
Our estimated fines-and their results-can also be compared with estimates
of average injury costs to the employer to obtain some idea of the implied in-
jury rate elasticity. The National Safety Council estimates that the average
employer cost of a disabling work injury is around $4,000, not including
property damage. 40 Let us arbitrarily assume that the average cost, with
property damage included, is $4,500. To obtain a 10 per cent reduction in
injuries would require, according to our estimates, a 35 to 70 per cent in-
crease in the average cost of injuries-an implied elasticity of injuries with
respect to their average cost of between .30 and .15. These elasticities are
certainly of a reasonable order of magnitude, and the difficulty in reducing
the injury rate they imply would seem to be supported by other evidence.
Oi cites a Wisconsin study of safety inspection effectiveness which asserts
that 75 per cent of all industrial accidents result not from some continuing
hazard, but rather from random events such as machine breakdowns, power
failures, faulty materials, or unpredictable acts by employees. 41 If only 25
per cent of injuries can be reduced by employment of safety inputs, one
would expect the low elasticities we estimate.
CONCLUSION
This paper has attempted to analyze the feasibility of replacing the cur-
rent standards approach to occupational safety with an injury tax approach,
which would require employers to pay a financial penalty for each injury oc-
curring in their workplaces. In particular, the study sought to determine (1)
whether injury rates across industries are inversely correlated with injury
costs, other things being equal, and (2) what sizes of taxes would be re-
quired to achieve given reductions in the injury rate. The general conclusions
which appear supportable are that the injury rate is indeed, sensitive to the
costs of injury, but that the taxes required to reduce these rates by even mod-
erate amounts would have to be very large.
To base an occupational safety policy on only the findings presented
here would, of course, be premature. The data used necessarily related to the
38 What Does It Cost to Comply With OSHA?, supra note 8.
39 The implication of note 8 supra, is, however, that compliance with OSHA standards will not
occur until after inspection has revealed a violation.4 0 See NATIONAL SAFETY CouNcil, supra note 13, at 23-25.
41 See Oi, supra note 12.
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early and middle 1960's, and replication of the study as soon as data from the
1972 Census of Manufactures is available would obviously be advisable.
Furthermore, a tax approach would probably be most effective if fines were
related to injury severity, and estimates of the required differentials among
severity levels were outside the scope of this study. Finally, only work injuries,
not illnesses, were studied. Nevertheless, this initial analysis of the tax ap-
proach suggests that such an approach is promising, and the results can serve
as a benchmark for future studies.
Appendix
TABLE A
ESTIMATES OF WAGE EQUATION*
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = In (WAGE)
Specification
Independent Variables I II
Constant
Education
Experience
Experience 2
Union
Deaths per 106 man-hours
Permanent impairments
per 106 man-hours
Temporary impairments
per 106 man-hours
Firm size
Class of Worker:
Government
Self employed
Occupation:
Professional worker
Manager
Clerical
Craftsmen
Operatives
Service workers
Laborers
Part-time
-. 158
(-2.50)
.046
(16.02)
.018
(9.31)
-. 026 x 10
- 2
(-6.97)
.102
(6.63)
1.238
(6.97)
.075
(2.57)
-. 006
(-3.79)
-. 003 x 10-2
(-.09)
-. 103
(-2.63)
-. 123
(-2.34)
.206
(5.53)
.175
(4.63)
-. 048
(-1.21)
.045
(1.31)
-. 081
(-Z.36)
-. 218
(-4.82)
-. 108
(2.58)
-. 296
(-8.87)
-. 232
(-3.54)
.045
(15.51)
.017
(9.08)
-. 025 x 10- 2(-6.88)
.098
(6.36)
.636
(2.40)
-. 033
(-.85)
-. 002
(-1.31)
-. 016 x 10-3
(-.55)
-. 121
(-3.08)
-1.20
(-2.29)
.186
(4.90)
.190
(5.01)
-. 057
(-1.40)
.028
(.79)
-. 090
(-2.60)
-. 131
(2.73)
-. 115
(-2.73)
-. 269
(-8.05)
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Demographic Characteristics:
Health problem
Spouse present
Spouse absent
Widowed
Divorced
Size of Urban Area:
SMSA< 250,000
SMSA 250-500,000
SMSA 500-750,000
SMSA>750,000
Region:Neortheast
North Central
West
Miatin:
Recent migrant
Years since migration
(Years since migration)2
Industry:
Construction
Durable manufacturing
Non-durable manufacturing
Wholesale trade
Business and repair services
Personal services
R
2
Std. Error of estimate
.096
(4.01)
.177
(7.26)
.224(1.78)
.115
(1.64)
.118
(2.61)
.067
(2.67)
.111
(4.31)
.161
(6.03)
.172
(8.77)
.125(6.35)
.134
(7.03)
.150
(6.73)
.006
(3.01)
-. 0013
(-.66)
.006 x 10-2
(1.39)
.45
.370
.094
(3.99)
.170(7.03)
.199
(1.59)
.118
(1.70)
.114
(2.55)
.066
(2.64)
.097
(3.77)
.153
(5.76)
.167
(8.51)
.121
(6.19)
.124
(6.52)
.149
(6.72)
.005
(2.57)
-. 0008
(-.40)
.006 x 10-2
(1.26)
.233
(5.03)
.193
(5.47)
.131
(3.96)
.164
(3.87)
.025
(.47)
-. 174
(-2.49)
.46
.366
*t values in parentheses.
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